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The "Good Old Days" of TRIPS:
The U.S. Trade Agenda and the Extension of
Pharmaceutical Test Data Protection
Susan Scafidi, J.D.*
Intellectual property rights carry significant implications for world
health. In 1994, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS) placed pharmaceuticals among the forms of technology
that constitute patentable subject matter.' Over the past ten years, non-
governmental organizations, governments, and international institutions
have increasingly acknowledged that this mandated inclusion influences
the availability of new drugs, at least within the member nations of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) .
The nature of this effect, however, remains open to debate. Whether
pharmaceutical patents provide financial incentives that support private
research and development, as the industry attests, or allow monopoly
pricing and production that hinder the ability of poor nations to address
health crises, such patents have become an unavoidable feature of global
medicine. The TRIPS-driven harmonization of intellectual property
protection across borders is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.
Although negotiations regarding the expansion of patent rights for
pharmaceuticals have been highly contested-with conflicts frequently
* Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law School; Associate Professor of Law and Adjunct
Associate Professor of History, Southern Methodist University. The author wishes to thank
Samantha Chaifetz and the staff of the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics for the
invitation to participate in this Case Study series.
1. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 C, art.
27.1, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (establishing that patents are available in all fields of
technology), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tripse/t.agmO-e.htm.
2. See generally Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 481 (2002) (offering a political perspective on the TRIPS Agreement and its
implementation).
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arising between developed and developing countries--the TRIPS
Agreement represents the result of extensive multilateral discussion. For
example, while the TRIPS Agreement requires a twenty-year minimum
4patent term, it allows countries to offer "limited exceptions to the
exclusive rights conferred by a patent" and includes provisions for
compulsory licensing of patented inventions under limited circumstances.
In the years since the TRIPS Agreement entered into force, this discussion
has continued, resulting in new statements on pharmaceutical patents and
public health issues in the 2001 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration,6 the
concurrent Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,7 and, most
recently, in an implementation agreement regarding the compulsory
licensing of patented pharmaceutical products." WTO member nations
have also agreed to extend the transition period for least-developed
countries to comply with those elements of the TRIPS Agreement related
to the protection of pharmaceuticals.9  However imperfect these
compromises, and whatever their eventual effect on global health, the new
agreements are intended to address the concerns of developing and least-
developed member nations. In this sense, the ongoing TRIPS process
represents a victory of collective bargaining power.
Recent U.S. bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs), by
contrast, do not offer trading partners an equivalent opportunity to
influence either the text or the implementation of intellectual property
3. Id.
4. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 33.
5. Id. at art. 30-31.
6. World Trade Org., Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min0l_e/mindecl e.htm.
7. World Trade Org., Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter TRIPS Public Health
Declaration], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0l_e/mindecl_trips~e.htm. The
TRIPS Public Health Declaration affirms that TRIPS "can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and,
in particular, to secure access to medicines for all." Id. at para. 4.
8. World Trade Org., General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/implem-para6e.htm. The agreement
describes the acceptable circumstances for compulsory licensing and for the export and
import of such goods.
9. TRIPS Public Health Declaration, supra note 7, at para. 7.
IV:2 (2004)
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provisions. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
is engaged in a systematic effort to increase international intellectual
property protection, one country at a time.' This effort is not limited to
the global consensus ostensibly embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, but
extends to additional protections in areas such as digital rights
management and the establishment of criminal sanctions for
infringement." Most significantly from a public health perspective, the
USTR seeks to supplant ambiguous provisions in TRIPS with concrete
substantive minima in FTAs for the protection of regulatory test data, or
the otherwise undisclosed scientific studies submitted to regulatory
agencies in the process of seeking approval to market pharmaceuticals.1
The legal status of this test data is of paramount importance to the
manufacturers of generic pharmaceutical products, who reference the
existence of brand-name pharmaceutical test data in order to obtain post-
patent marketing approval for their own, less expensive versions of the
same drugs. This indirect reliance, in turn, affects the price of generic
pharmaceuticals and the degree of public access to these medicines.
Although the United States has engaged in ongoing consultations with
Argentina on this intellectual property and public health matter under the
aegis of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, it has thus far
declined to submit the question of what constitutes adequate test data
protection under TRIPS to a WTO panel, 3 preferring instead to enshrine
10. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2003 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (May 1,
2003), http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2003/fullreport.pdf.
11. Id.
12. See id.; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993)
[herinafter NAFTA Agreement], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafta.shtml; United States - Singapore Free
Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2003) [hereinafter Singapore FTA],
available at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Singapore/final.htm; United States - Chile Free
Trade Agreement,June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2003) [hereinafter Chile FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/text/index.htm; Central American Free Trade
Agreement, Jan. 28, 2004, (draft text) [hereinafter CAFTA Agreement], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Cafta/text/index.htm; and United States - Morocco Free
Trade Agreement, Mar. 31, 2004 (draft text) [hereinafter Morocco FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Morocco/text/index.htm.
13. World Trade Org. Dispute Settlement Body, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution
According to the Conditions Set Forth in the Agreement, Argentina - Patent Protection for
Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, WT/DS171/3, Argentina -
Certain Measures on the Protection of Patents and Test Data, WT/DS1 96/4 (June 20, 2002);
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Dispute Settlement Update (Mar. 9, 2004),
3
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its favored interpretation in various bilateral and regional FTAs.
This brief Case Study describes the treatment of pharmaceutical
regulatory test data under both TRIPS and recent U.S. FTAs and argues
that there has been an increasing elaboration of protective legal structures
in the latter. While individual countries may perceive benefit in expanding
their protection of test data, such public health analysis should not take
place under the pressure of free trade negotiations.' 4 The TRIPS
Agreement and its implementation may be far from ideal, but its
transparent, multilateral approach to intellectual property harmonization
offers technology-importing nations greater influence over evolving issues
like pharmaceutical test data protection than the often unequal free trade
negotiation process.
UNDERSTANDING TEST DATA PROVISIONS
TRIPS ARTICLE 39.3
The first step in understanding the contested international treatment
of pharmaceutical test data is to analyze the relevant provision of the
TRIPS Agreement. Protection for pharmaceutical test data in TRIPS is cast
as an extension of the provisions regarding "unfair competition" found in
Article lObis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property.' 5 Under this general rubric, Article 39 of TRIPS provides for the
protection of "undisclosed information" or trade secrets. The provision
regarding test data, Article 39.3, is the result of a compromise among
available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/update.pdf [hereinafter Dispute Settlement
Update].
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body can interpret TRIPS provisions but is not
authorized to expand protection, and it has avoided the temptation to fill gaps in the
Agreement. J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 441, 446-49 (2000).
14. Even in the United States the expanded protection of test data is a relatively recent
development, driven largely by the perceived inadequacy of the patent system to provide
financial incentives for the development of certain pharmaceuticals with limited markets.
The United States first attempted to address this issue in 1982 with the passage of the
Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §360cc (2004).
15. P'ris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis. The TRIPS
Agreement refers directly to the Paris Convention, which was established in 1883 for the
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differing submissions from several participating nations.16 The final version
reads as follows:
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the
origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such
data against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect
such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the
public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected
against unfair commercial use.
17
Among the several undefined terms in Article 39.3, the issues of what
constitutes a "new chemical entity" and how to define the limits of "unfair
commercial use" appear to be the most pressing."'
TRIPS requires that member nations provide test data protection only
for "new chemical entities," which at a minimum should exclude
substances that have previously received regulatory approval. In the
pharmaceutical context, this provision would arguably not require
protection for new combinations, dosages, applications, or formulations of
existing drugs, even if they required submission of additional test data to
gain marketing approval.1 9 This limitation, even if assumed, does not clarify
whether "new" indicates novelty in the patent sense or merely a fresh
submission for marketing approval, either in the member state or
worldwide. Under the most restrictive (and least likely) interpretation, a
new chemical entity would have to represent a novel patentable invention,
and only such products would be entitled to test data protection. An
interpretation more consistent with the intent of the countries that
originally sought the test data provision would require protection for all
previously undisclosed, first-time marketing approval submissions, whether
or not the chemical entity were eligible for patent protection.20 Further
16. SeeJAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 197-99 (2000); G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and
Other Data Required by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 Nw.J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 1, 5-20
(2003).
17. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3.
18. See WATAL, supra note 16, at 203-06; Skillington & Solovy, supra note 16, at 25-28, 29-
35; Carlos M. Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of Data Submitted
for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 CHI.J. INT'L. L. 69, 74-75, 76-79 (2002).
19. Correa, supra note 18, at 75.
20. See id. at 74-75.
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evidence that TRIPS Article 39.3 is unclear as to the definition of "new"
includes recent U.S. FrAs that either eliminate the modifier entirely or
include separate provisions for new and pre-existing chemical products.2'
Under the TRIPS Agreement, then, member states are free to adapt their
understanding of the category of "new chemical entities" to suit national
health care policy.
Much of the discussion of "unfair commercial use" under Article 39.3
involves the question of whether third parties can rely on protected
undisclosed test data to obtain marketing approval for their own products.
In particular, a company seeking to market a generic drug can avoid vast,
inefficient expenditures of time and money if it is able to simply submit
evidence of bioequivalence (equal potency and availability to the body)
with a previously approved chemical entity in order to support its own
application. In this case, the government entity that required submission of
the original test data has not disclosed it to the third party or even
necessarily made "use" of the test data, much less unfair commercial use.
Instead, it may be argued that the government has merely affirmed the
interchangeability of the two compounds in a manner consistent with
public health concerns regarding access to medicines.2 This narrow
interpretation of what constitutes unfair commercial use in the context of
pharmaceutical test data is controversial. Whether or not a health agency
actually consults data on safety and efficacy before approving an equivalent
drug or merely remains aware that such data exists, a later application
submitted without independent test data could not meet government
standards without the existence of the original test data. The third party
applicant thus derives commercial advantage from a regulatory process
that makes use of undisclosed test data, arguably an unfair benefit.
National health policies seek to balance this alleged unfairness with the
public benefits of a robust generics industry.
Early versions of Article 39.3 contained a specific requirement that
would have precluded third parties from relying on undisclosed test data
to facilitate the approval of competing products for a "reasonable" periodof " 23
of time. Some commentators have argued that temporal exclusivity
provisions are the only way to ensure protection against unfair commercial
use consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. 24 Given that TRIPS Article 39.3
21. See infra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
22. Correa, supra note 18, at 80 (discussing Bayer v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999]
1 F.C. 553).
23. WATAL, supra note 16, at 197-99; Skillingto.n & Solovy, supra note 16, at 5-20.
24. See, e.g., Skillington & Solovy, supra note 16, at 33.
IV:2 (2004)
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is silent with respect to the type of substantive minima required for other
areas of intellectual property protection, it is unclear that member states
could be forced to provide specific periods of absolute test data protection.
Aside from ongoing consultations with Argentina, the United States's
preferred method of limiting third party reliance on pharmaceutical test
data is the inclusion of multi-year periods of exclusive use in its free trade
26
agreements. Apparent flexibility in the interpretation of TRIPS is thus
curtailed by the greater obligations required by parallel instruments.
U.S. Free Trade Agreements
The extent to which the United States was forced to compromise on
the issue of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical test data protection
in the TRIPS Agreement is apparent from both historical accounts of the
original TRIPS negotiation process7 and the more extensive protection
mandated by bilateral and multilateral FTAs. Representative examples of
FTAs with more extensive intellectual property provisions than TRIPS
include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), enacted
shortly before the TRIPS Agreement, and recent agreements or proposed
agreements with Singapore, Chile, Central American nations, and
Morocco. The progression from NAFTA, which includes test data
provisions that the United States tried and failed to incorporate into
TRIPS, to the most recent agreements illustrates the increasingly
protectionist objectives of the USTR. The newest FTAs attempt not only to
close the loopholes of TRIPS with respect to test data protection, but also
to extend the term of patent protection for pharmaceutical products in
order to account for the period of regulatory review.28
The NAFTA Agreement, like TRIPS, treats test data as a form of trade
secret, focusing initially on nondisclosure and then, if disclosure occurs, on
the prevention of unfair commercial use. 9 Protection is limited to
agricultural and chemical products containing "new chemical entities,"
although as in TRIPS there is no effort to define "new."30 With regard to
the reliance of generics companies on protected data to obtain marketing
approval, NAFTA requires exclusivity for a "reasonable period," defined as
25. Dispute Settlement Update, supra note 13.
26. See infra notes 28-49 and accompanying text.
27. See Sell, supra note 3.
28. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
29. NAFTA Agreement, supra note 12, at art. 1711(5).
30. Id.
7
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''normally" at least five years and conditioned upon both the nature of the
data and the effort and expenditure required to produce iti 1 Should a
third party attempt to rely on test data submitted in another NAFTA
country, the exclusivity period runs from the date of the first marketing
approval cited.32  However, NAFTA provisions specifically authorize
"abbreviated approval procedures" for competing products following the
exclusivity period, effectively limiting claims of unfair commercial use.33
Despite U.S. efforts, TRIPS includes no such temporal exclusivity
requirement. There is no distinction in either NAFTA or TRIPS between
pharmaceutical and chemical products.
In contrast to NAFTA, concluded a decade earlier, the United States -
Singapore Free Trade Agreement (Singapore FTA) does not invoke trade
secret protection for test data. Instead, Singapore and subsequent FTAs
include special provisions for "certain regulated products," such as
pharmaceuticals. 34 The Singapore FTA provides that "information
regarding the safety and efficacy of a pharmaceutical or agricultural
chemical product" shall be excluded from third party reliance in
marketing approval for five and ten years, respectively. 3 There is no
mention of the effort expended in producing the "information," nor is
there a requirement that the products be "new." The flexible five-year
presumption in NAFTA is transformed in the Singapore FTA into fixed
periods of five years for pharmaceuticals and ten for agricultural
36chemicals, a shift reflected in subsequent U.S. FTAs.
In addition, several provisions in the Singapore FTA effectively
lengthen the terms of test data protection and pharmaceutical patent
protection. Unlike NAFTA, the period during which test data submitted in
another country cannot be used for marketing approval without consent
runs not from the date of the foreign approval, but from the later of the
foreign approval date or the domestic approval date for the original
product.3 7 Additional efforts to lengthen the effective term of protection
for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals under the Singapore FTA
include the requirement that the exclusivity period for data pertaining to
patented products be allowed to continue past expiration of the patent
31. Id. at art. 1711(6).
32. Id. at art. 1711(7).
33. Id. at art. 1711(6).
34. Singapore FFA, supra note 12, at art. 16.8.
35. Id. at art. 16.8(1).
36. Id.
37. Id. at art. 16.8(2).
IV:2 (2004)
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term, should the patent expire before the end of the exclusivity period.8
The Singapore FTA also introduces a provision, for pharmaceuticals only,
for patent term extensions to compensate for "unreasonable curtailment
of the patent term as a result of the marketing approval process. 3 9 Finally,
pharmaceutical patent holders are entitled to notification of the identity of
"any third party requesting market approval effective during the term of
the patent," as well as assurance that such marketing approval will not be
granted during the patent term without consent. 40 These pharmaceutical
patent extensions, which appear in neither NAFTA nor TRIPS, are
included in later FTAs as well.4'
The draft United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement (Chile FTA),
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and United States -
Morocco Free Trade Agreement (Morocco FTA) each continue to refine
the definition of a "new" pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product
and how to measure the duration of test data protection. The Chile FTA
and CAFTA define "new" products as those that have not been previously
approved,42 rather than new or novel in the patent sense; CAFTA also
specifies that the products not have received marketing approval in the
individual member country.43 With respect to third party marketing
approval on the basis of previously submitted test data, both the Chile FTA
and CAFTA echo the Singapore FTA's exclusivity periods of five years for
pharmaceuticals and ten for agricultural chemicals.i In addition, CAFTA
provides that the exclusivity period shall run from the date that the
original applicant received marketing approval in the individual CAFTA
member country-rather than in any foreign country-although CAFTA
members may condition this term of protection on the original applicant
seeking approval in the member country within five years of the foreign
application.
The Morocco FTA goes beyond earlier agreements by protecting, in
addition to the basic category of regulatory test data for new
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, a separate body of new
38. Id. at art. 16.8(3).
39. Id. at art. 16.8(4) (a).
40. Id. at art. 16.8(4) (b-c).
41. CAFIrA refers to this grant as "restoration" rather than "extension" of the patent
term. CAFTA, supra note 12, at art. 15.10.
42. Chile FTA, supra note 9, at art. 17.10(1); CATA, supra note 9, at art. 15.10(1) (c).
43. CAFTA, supra note 9, at art. 15.10(1) (c).
44. Chile FTA, supra note 9, at art. 17.10(1); CAFTA, supra note 9, at art. 15.10(1) (a).
45. CAFTA, supra note 9, at art. 15.10(1)(b).
9
Scafidi: The "Good Old Days" of TRIPS
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
clinical information required for the approval of (not necessarily new)
pharmaceutical products, other than information related to
bioequivalency. Like the Singapore and Chile FTAs and CAiFTA, the
Morocco FTA grants exclusivity periods for pharmaceutical and
agricultural products of five and ten years, respectively, measured in this
47
case from the date of original approval within the contracting country.
For new clinical information, which might pertain to previously reviewed
or approved pharmaceuticals, the period of protection is limited to three
years.48 In addition, protection of new clinical information is conditioned
upon the requirement that its origination involve "considerable effort.
'4
1
Although the language regarding effort echoes NAFTA and TRIPS, the
division between new products and new clinical information indicates the
development of an additional category of protected information that could
affect the availability of existing pharmaceutical chemicals approved for
new applications.
CONCLUSION
From the early suggestion in NAFTA that original applicants should
enjoy a "reasonable period" of exclusivity with respect to reliance on
pharmaceutical test data to standardized periods of protection and
expansive definition of what constitutes a "new" product, the mechanism
of free trade agreements has allowed the United States to establish
international levels of protection far beyond the original, deliberately
ambiguous TRIPS consensus on trade secrets. While some countries may
enjoy benefits similar to those that the United States identified in creating
its own domestic protections for test data, 0 others may not yet have
reached the stage at which incentives to invest in the creation of clinical
data for new drug approval outweigh the need to facilitate marketing of
competing versions on an expedited basis. The serial free trade
negotiation process, particularly between nations with unequal bargaining
power, is an unlikely forum for development of comprehensive, balanced
policies on health care. It is, however, an opportunity for the United States
to advance elements of intellectual property protection that exceed
worldwide norms. This apparent divide-and-conquer strategy on the part of
46. Morocco FTA, supra note 9, at art. 15.10(1-2).
47. Id. at art. 15.10(1).
48. Id. at art. 15.10(2).
49. Id.
50. See Skillington & Solovy, supra note 16, at 8-11.
IV:2 (2004)
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the United States circumvents the multilateral nature of TRIPS
negotiations, decreases opportunities for the flexible interpretation of
TRIPS by member nations, effectively lengthens the terms of
pharmaceutical patents, and threatens to create a de facto global standard
that may adversely affect the development of generic pharmaceutical
production capacity. Although the TRIPS regime represents a global
compromise that required many nations to increase intellectual property
protections only with great reluctance, recent U.S. FTAs make TRIPS look
like the good old days.
11
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